Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions

Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions
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ISBN-10 : OCLC:1375623558
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Book Synopsis Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions by : Werner Güth

Download or read book Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions written by Werner Güth and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.


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An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and pr