Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Externalities and Reference-price Effect

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Externalities and Reference-price Effect
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Book Synopsis Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Externalities and Reference-price Effect by : Jafar Chaab

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