Solutions for Two-person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information

Solutions for Two-person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information
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ISBN-10 : OCLC:59697907
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Book Synopsis Solutions for Two-person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information by : Roger B. Myerson

Download or read book Solutions for Two-person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information written by Roger B. Myerson and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


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