Incentive Contracts and Efficiency in a Frictional Market
Author | : Benoit Julien |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 40 |
Release | : 2019 |
ISBN-10 | : OCLC:1304235076 |
ISBN-13 | : |
Rating | : 4/5 (76 Downloads) |
Download or read book Incentive Contracts and Efficiency in a Frictional Market written by Benoit Julien and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Principals seek to trade with agents by posting incentive contracts in a search environment. A contract solves the ex ante search problem, and adverse selection and moral hazard ex post. We fully characterise the equilibrium for quasi linear preferences, and derive some comparative statics. If using appropriate transfers the equilibrium allocation is constrained welfare optimal, in contrast to the one-to-one principal-agent problem. Search frictions thus correct that inefficiency because searching requires internalizing the utility of agents. Incentives are weaker than in bilateral contracting, and agents enjoy more efficient risk sharing. With a constraint on transfers search and moral hazard interact and may induce an inefficient allocation; principal competition results in over-insurance of the agents and too little effort in equilibrium.