The Balanced Solution for Co-operative Transferable Utility Games

The Balanced Solution for Co-operative Transferable Utility Games
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Total Pages : 0
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ISBN-10 : OCLC:196620639
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Book Synopsis The Balanced Solution for Co-operative Transferable Utility Games by : Johannes René Brink

Download or read book The Balanced Solution for Co-operative Transferable Utility Games written by Johannes René Brink and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


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